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AIMS: The paper investigates the effects of misinformation regarding dividend payouts on bubble 
formation, asset pricing and individual investment returns in experimental asset markets, when 
correct information about the expected dividends and their probabilities is also available. 
METHOD: In two experiments, totaling34 Smith-Suchanek-Williams type double-auction 
continuous experimental markets (238 subjects), participants were exposed to misinformation 
regarding dividend payouts in a previous game, with the correct dividend matrix also provided. The 
misinformation stated the dividends in the previous game to have been much lower or much higher 
than according to the expected value function. The misinformation was either homogenous for all 
participants or provided to only half of the investors in a market (heterogeneously).
RESULTS:Homogenous misinformation stating that the last game’s dividend payouts were high, 
led to larger overpricing throughout the game, as compared to baseline (no misinformation) and 
homogenous misinformation stating that the last game’s dividends were low. In informationally 
heterogeneous markets, where half of the participants received “high dividends” misinformation 
and half remained non-misinformed, transaction prices were the lowest compared to the 
aforementioned treatments. It was also discovered that agents receiving the ‘high dividend’ 
misinformation had lower returns than non-misinformed participants in the same heterogeneous 
market.
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Individual investors constitute between 12-30 per 
cent of the market cap on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
and nearly half of them have little or very little 
experience investing (Kliber, Łęt & Rutkowska, 2016). In 
other countries, such as China, individual investors may 
even constitute a majority of the market. Moreover, 
according to the OLG (overlapping generations) models 
(e.g. Garleanu & Panageas, 2015; Gali, 2016; Domeij & 
Ellingsen, 2017), investors enter and leave the market 
based on their lifecycle, meaning that there are always new, 
inexperienced investors present in any financial market. 
Inexperienced investors may be the ones responsible for 
the generation of market bubbles (Greenwood & Nagel, 
2009; Gong, Pan & Shi, 2016; Xie & Zhang, 2016). It is also 
individual investors, especially inexperienced ones, who 
are the most at risk of manipulation, trying to make them 
the ‘greater fools’ (e.g. Levine & Zajac, 2007). One type of 
manipulation which can be effective in changing investors’ 
preferences is injecting misinformation into the market, 
which may prompt investors to either buy or sell shares 
at unfavorable prices, or at least may generate noise 
and informational heterogeneity in a market. This paper 
investigates the effects of misinformation on transaction 
prices and individual investment returns in the context of 
experimental markets.
Continuous double-auction asset markets (Smith, 
Suchanek & Williams, 1988. Hereafter SSW) are one of 
the fundamental research paradigms in experimental 
economics, used by numerous researchers (e.g. Paich & 
Sterman, 1993; Porter & Smith, 1995; Hussam, Porter & 
Smith, 2008; Lahav, 2011; Friedman, Harrison & Salmon, 
1984; King, 1991; Lei, Noussair & Plott, 2001) to delve into 
how economic agents behave in conditions similar to those 
present in real security markets. A traditional SSW market 
consists of 10 or 15 periods (e.g. Palan, 2013; Porter & 
Smith, 1994) lasting 120-180 seconds (a notable exception 
being a 200 period market by Lahav, 2011), during which 
participants engage in a real-time double-auction in which 
one type of asset is traded between them. The fundamental 
value of an asset is determined by dividends paid after 
each period with probabilities known to the participants. 
For example, instructions may state that after each turn 
there is an equal 25% probability that the dividend will 
be 20, 15, 10 or 5 dollars per share. In such an example, 
the fundamental value of an asset (according to Pascal’s 
EV model) is simply the mean dividend multiplied by the 
number of remaining periods (or remaining dividend 
payouts). The dividend probability matrices vary in the 
research, changing from the ‘traditional’ monotonously 
falling fundamental value (Smith, Suchanek & Williams, 
1988), to flat or rising (Stoeckl, Huber & Kirchler, 2014; 
Noussair, Robin & Ruffieux, 2001), to non-monotonous 
(Noussair & Powell, 2010). 
Perhaps one of the most important elements which 
made SSW markets popular and useful for research is that 
transaction prices in SSW markets may be compared to a 
rational homo economicus model carrying the assumption 
that prices should follow the fundamental value. In reality, 
SSW market prices do not always reflect the underlying 
value of expected dividends. A lot of research (for a review 
see Porter & Smith, 1994) including the seminal research 
by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) demonstrates 
the participants’ tendency to offer prices much higher 
than the fundamental value. Such an overpricing (or 
‘bubble’) persists until the endgame, when a rapid decline 
in prices and underpricing (‘crash’) is often observed. 
Though a catalogue of cognitive, social and emotional 
biases (e.g. Shiller, 2011; Camerer, 1989; Rao, Greve & 
Davis, 2001; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Depositario, Nayga, 
Zhang & Mariano, 2014) or speculation based on Keynes’ 
greater fool theory are postulated as potential causes of 
the overpricing and underpricing, we are far from truly 
understanding why bubbles and crashes occur.
Procedural models of decision making clearly mark the 
collection, selectionand interpretation of information as 
one of the most important pre-decisional processes (e.g. 
Connolly & Thorn, 1987; Newell, Lagnado & Shanks, 2007). 
The quality of information one possesses determines 
the quality of decisions made. Researching the impact 
of information on economic decision making under risk 
and uncertainty (including experimental asset markets) 
is therefore of high importance and application value. 
Such is the case of research on insider trading. Numerous 
publications (e.g. Patterson, 1967; Kyle, 1985; Jaffe, 1974; 
Seyhun, 1986; Acharya & Johnson, 2007) show that insiders 
dominate the market they are in, gaining extra returns 
when compared to agents with average information. The 
same is true in SSW experimental markets (Grossman, 
1976; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; Diamond & Verecchia, 
1981; King, 1991; Plott & Sunder, 1982). 
Huber, Kirchler and Sutter (2008) treated insider 
information as a continuous variable. In their research 
they created an SSW market with varying levels of 
information for each participant. Results indicated that 
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agents with better information dominated their less-
informed counterparts, however this was only true for the 
best-informed agents.
Research on insider trading clearly shows why most 
governments penalize the use of insider information 
during the purchase or sale of financial instruments, 
and why strict rules on public information admission are 
imposed on companies listed on nearly any stock exchange. 
However, as demonstrated in the aforementioned 
research by Huber et al. (2008), insider information could 
very well be treated as having better information than 
others, even if the information does not directly provide 
riskless returns. The other end of the continuum would 
be having worse information than others. Talk is cheap, 
and the Internet and media are full of recommendations, 
analyses and commentaries concerning nearly all financial 
instruments currently traded. So far very little research has 
been devoted to exploring the consequences of incorrect 
or misleading information provided to market agents. 
Corgnet, Kujal and Porter (2007) demonstrated that 
uninformative announcements given to market agents 
may influence asset prices in experimental markets. 
In their research they modified a standard SSW market 
to include a box in which the announcement ‘The price 
is too high!’ was shown in turns 3, 7 and 12 (out of 
15). The announcement was presented regardless of 
the actual transaction prices made by the participants, 
and participants were clearly instructed that such an 
announcement would appear exactly in turns 3, 7 and 
12. Despite such a strict manipulation, transaction prices 
dropped following the announcements. Corgnet et al. 
suggest that the uninformative announcements may 
facilitate coordination of beliefs among traders (p.7), i.e. 
suggest to the subjects what the behavior of others may be, 
or that they may facilitate the computation of the rational 
expectations equilibrium (p.7), i.e. making agents focus on 
the fundamental value of the traded instrument.
A discussion of incorrect information would not be 
complete without presenting the misinformation effect 
(Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978) and its social-psychological 
counterparts – memory conformity (Wright, Self & Justice, 
2000) and social contagion of memory (Roediger, Meade 
& Bergman, 2001). A standard misinformation procedure 
consists of three phases: presenting correct information 
(called original information in most research), presenting 
a misleading source of information on the same event/
knowledge as the original information (such as an 
incorrect description of the original; usually called the 
post-event information), and testing the memory of the 
original information. A large quantity of research shows 
that participants exposed to the misleading post-event 
information tend to include incorrect details from the 
post-event source when asked about the original. As 
mentioned earlier, the quality of information possessed 
by an agent is critical for the quality of decisions made. 
Should misinformation influence decisions made by 
market agents, such an effect would not be eliminated 
by legislation forcing the stock companies to provide 
information to everyone at the same time. Regardless of 
the availability of original (correct) information, agents 
may still change their decisions based on misinformation 
coming from unofficial, and therefore uncontrolled 
sources. 
For the reasons presented above, researching the 
influence of misleading post-event information on 
decisions made by market agents (or more specifically – 
on transaction prices as a direct consequence of these 
decisions) seems of high importance. The presented 
research aims to test exactly that in the context of SSW 
experimental asset markets.
experIment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to explore the influence 
of misinformation suggesting high- or low dividends (in 
opposition to the actual dividend probabilities serving as 
original information) on asset prices in an SSW market. 
It was expected that misinformation suggesting high 
dividends would lead to higher transaction prices than the 
baseline (i.e. a treatment without misleading information), 
and conversely that misinformation suggesting low 
dividends would lower transaction prices.
method
participants
One hundred and sixty four participants (102 female 
and 62 male) aged 18-38 years (M = 22,32; SD = 3,50) 
were recruited from a database of students (various 
faculties) willing to participate in research for credit. 
Participants constituted thirty markets of 4-7 participants, 
which in turn were randomly assigned to one of the three 
treatments: baseline – no misinformation (10 markets, N = 
54), High Dividend (10 markets, N = 56) and Low Dividend 
(10 markets, N = 54). Participants received remuneration 
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based on their investment account balance at the end of 
the market – for every 100 tokens they received 1 PLN 
(approx. $ 0,3). Information about remuneration was 
included in the recruitment ad.
materials and equipment
The experimental market was programmed in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and consisted of 10 periods, 120 
seconds each. Participants were given an equal initial 
endowment of 4 stocks and 600 tokens, which they 
could freely trade throughout the duration of the market, 
provided they had the required funds. As usual for SSW 
experimental markets, participants were allowed to 
set bid/ask offers at any price desired, as well as accept 
offers made by other participants. After each period, a 
dividend was randomly generated according to a payout 
matrix of 0, 5, 15 or 40 tokens per share, each with a 25% 
probability. Dividend payouts were immediately added to 
the participants’ balance. 
The payout matrix resulted in an average dividend of 
15 tokens. The fundamental value began at 150 tokens in 
Period 1 and fell monotonously at 15 tokens per period, 
reaching 15 tokens in Period 10.
The original information was included within market 
instructions, containing the critical data about the dividend 
payout matrix:
The dividends are randomly generated as follows:
25 percent chance that the dividend will be 40 tokens 
per share
25 percent chance that the dividend will be 15 tokens 
per share
25 percent chance that the dividend will be 5 tokens 
per share
25 percent chance that the dividend will be 0 tokens 
per share
The post-event information was presented to the 
participants within ‘another participant’s description of 
the game’. The information was a half-page text covering 
the ‘participant’s’ feelings and thoughts on the market 
they took part in. One critical sentence regarding dividend 
payouts was manipulated between conditions. In the High 
Dividend treatment, the sentence stated the dividends 
were very high, we got 40 tokens seven times – I regretted 
not buying more stocks. In the Low Dividend treatment 
the text stated that the dividends were very low, we got 
0 tokens seven times – I regretted not selling more stocks. 
In the baseline treatment, the statement was absent from 
the description.
procedure
The research was conducted in a computer lab. 
Participants were given instructions on paper and asked 
to read them thoroughly. Shortly afterwards they were 
given the post-event information and asked to read it, 
followed by a trial period of the experimental market, in 
order for the participants to understand it. The average 
total duration of the experiment was 45 minutes.
data analysis
A major statistical problem with experimental markets 
is that the individual transaction prices are not independent. 
Moreover, the dynamic of a single experimental market, 
while random, acts as a non-random latent variable for 
all transaction prices in this market. Hence, most research 
in experimental markets resorts to descriptive statistics of 
bubble magnitude or duration as the only analysis (for an 
overview Palan, 2013). Such an approach does not test for 
statistical significance of differences between treatments, 
and significantly reduces data. The presented research 
used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) as a solution to 
the above problem.  HLM does not require independence 
of level-1 observations (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Miller 
& Murdock, 2007). In fact, the reason for using HLM is 
to research data dependent on higher-level structures. A 
detailed explanation of HLM falls outside the scope of this 
article, and the book by Raudenbush and Bryk (2004) is a 
recommended reading on the subject.
results
Preliminary analyses showed that participants did not 
significantly vary across treatments in age (Ms = 22.52, 
22.89 and 21.57 years in baseline, Low Dividend and 
High Dividend, respectively; F(2,161 = 2,098, p = ,126) or 
gender (32 female and 22 male in baseline, 38 female and 
16 male in Low Dividend, 32 female and 24 male in High 
Dividend; χ2(1, N = 164) = 2,341, p = ,310). 120 participants 
had secondary education, 44 higher education. Four 
of the participants declared to have invested in a stock 
market. Two of the participants declared having studied 
economics, two declared having learned economics 
otherwise.
Transaction prices were analyzed using HLM creating 
unique identifiers for each pair of buyer-seller and unique 
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identifiers for each market. The tested model included the 
treatment and period as independent variables. The HLM 
model was:
PRICEijk = y000 + y100 * TREATMENTjk + 
+ y200 * PERIODijk + r0jk +u00k + eijk
where       PRICE = transaction price,
    TREATMENT = experimental treatment 
type,
           PERIOD = period number,
           γ000 = level-3 regression intercept,
Treatment Mean Std. error df 95% CI
baseline 119,42 15,63 26,96 87,35 – 151,49
LD 126,62 15,65 27,09 94,52 – 158,72
HD 176,96 15,66 27,19 144,83 – 209,08
       u00k = level-3 random error, based on the 
k-th market,
       β00k = level-2 intercept, based on the k-th 
market,
           r0jk = level-2 random error, based on the k-th 
market and j-th buyer-seller,
	 	 	 	 	 	 π0jk = level-1 intercept, based on the k-th 
market and j-th buyer-seller,
           eijk = level-1 random error, based on the k-th 
market, j-th buyer-seller and i-th transaction.
Both Treatment (HLM-corrected F(2;27,083) = 4,011; 
Period Compared treatments Mean diff. Std. error df p 95% CI
1 baseline
LD
LD 
HD 
HD
15,48
1,89
-13,58
22,72
22,72
22,78
30,12
30,07
30,397
0,501
0,934
0,555
-30,93
-44,49
-60,07
61,88
48,28
32,91
2 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
9,78
23,37
13,60
23,05
23,01
22,91
31,88
31,673
31,114
0,674
0,317
0,557
-37,18
-23,52
-33,12
56,73
70,27
60,32
3 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-14,52
-15,56
-1,04
23,13
23,25
23,31
32,351
32,979
33,322
0,535
0,508
0,965
-61,62
-62,85
-48,44
32,59
31,74
46,36
4 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-10,76
-48,23
-37,48
23,13
23,37
23,60
32,31
33,685
35,051
0,645
0,047
0,121
-57,85
-95,74
-85,40
36,34
-0,73
10,44
5 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-15,09
-49,63
-34,54
23,38
23,69
23,56
33,759
35,557
34,774
0,523
0,043
0,152
-62,62
-97,69
-82,38
32,44
-1,57
13,29
6 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-9,34
-69,14
-59,81
23,27
23,57
23,87
33,126
34,842
36,66
0,691
0,006
0,017
-56,68
-117,00
-108,19
38,00
-21,29
-11,42
7 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-37,74
-104,57
-66,83
23,26
23,73
23,70
33,06
35,813
35,649
0,114
<,001
0,008
-85,06
-152,71
-114,92
9,58
-56,44
-18,74
8 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-25,39
-88,01
-62,62
23,61
23,81
23,79
35,078
36,281
36,17
0,289
0,001
0,012
-73,32
-136,28
-110,86
22,53
-39,74
-14,37
9 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
-2,11
-100,97
-98,86
23,75
24,04
24,01
35,929
37,693
37,551
0,93
<,001
<,001
-50,28
-149,64
-147,49
46,06
-52,30
-50,23
10 baseline
LD
LD
HD
HD
17,70
-124,54
-142,24
23,64
23,66
23,79
35,273
35,362
36,18
0,459
<,001
<,001
-30,28
-172,54
-190,48
65,68
-76,53
-93,99
Table 2: Multiple comparisons of transaction prices across treatments and periods (Experiment 1)
Note: LD - Low Dividend, HD – High Dividend 
Note: LD - Low Dividend, HD – High Dividend 
Table 1: Transaction prices across treatments
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p = ,030) and Period (F (9;2710,238) = 28,195; p< ,001) 
as well as their interaction (F (18;2699,423) = 24,099; 
p< ,001) turned out to be statistically significant. Means, 
standard errors and confidence intervals of transaction 
prices across treatments are shown in Table 1. Multiple 
comparisons of Treatment * Period are shown in Table 2.
Transaction prices across treatments in all periods are 
shown in Figure 1. Prices in the High Dividend treatment 
were significantly higher than in the other treatments 
in Period 10. In periods 4-9 prices in High Dividend 
treatment were significantly higher than in the baseline. 
No significant differences between the baseline and Low 
Dividend treatments were found.
Figure 1: Transaction prices across treatments (Experiment 1)
discussion
Results of Experiment 1 were only partially consistent 
with the hypotheses. Higher transaction prices were 
observed in the High Dividend treatment, as expected, 
showing that  misinformation suggesting higher than 
average dividends is considered by participants to be 
a useful piece of ‘advice’, regardless of its inconsistency 
with the actual dividend probability matrix. As a result, 
a classic bubble is observed in the High Dividend group, 
with prices exceeding the fundamental value in periods 
3 through 10. In turns 6 through 10, prices exceeded the 
maximum possible remaining dividends (at 40 tokens per 
period). Moreover, the bubble did not burst in the final 
periods. 
A more perplexing result was that transaction 
prices in the Low Dividend treatment were actually 
higher than baseline (although lower than in the High 
Dividend treatment). Prices in this group were expected 
to be lower than baseline due to the misinformation 
suggesting low dividends. Since the misinformation 
suggesting high dividends, as well as the misinformation 
suggesting low dividends, both resulted in an increase in 
transaction prices, a question arises: what do these two 
treatments have in common? At first glance they could 
be considered mirror images of each other, with the High 
Dividend treatment suggesting a 7/10 chance of getting 
the 40 token dividends, and the Low Dividend treatment 
suggesting a 7/10 chance of getting zero token dividends. 
However, both treatments carry a common element of the 
misinformation itself: all participants in both experimental 
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treatments receive the same information regarding 
dividends, which can be interpreted as an increase in 
informational homogeneity, or a decrease in informational 
heterogeneity (Stiglitz, 1987; Page, 2008). As shown by 
Sutter, Huber andKirchler (2012), a higher informational 
heterogeneity reduces market bubbles as compared to 
informationally homogenous markets. It can be assumed 
that while all participants in the baseline treatment also 
receive the same information, the dividend probability 
matrix does not directly suggest a single strategy (whether 
buying shares is profitable), and the matrix itself can be 
interpreted differently by various participants, for example 
based on their risk preferences. Misinformation, on the 
other hand, explicitly stated whether dividends were 
high or low, and whether buying or selling shares was 
the better option – such information leaves less space for 
individual interpretation than the dividend matrix.Similar 
conclusions can be drawn from the paper by Corgnet, 
Kujaland Porter (2007) and their idea that uninformative 
announcements facilitate coordination between agents. 
If such an interpretation is true, transaction prices in a 
heterogeneously misinformed treatment should be lower 
than baseline, and lower than both the homogenously 
misinformed groups.
experIment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test the hypothesis 
that unlike homogenous misinformation, heterogeneous 
misinformation would lead to lowered transaction prices. 
Informationally homogenous groups (High Dividend and 
Low Dividend) and baseline from Experiment 1 would be 
compared with a heterogeneously misinformed group. 
Since the High Dividend treatment generated the highest 
transaction prices in Experiment 1, the strongest test 
of the hypothesis would be to create a group in which 
half of the participants would receive High Dividend 
misinformation, and the other half would receive no 
misinformation. Should misinformation not influence 
informational homogeneity, transaction prices in such a 
group would be higher than baseline. 
method
participants
Seventy-four students of various faculties (46 
female and 28 male), aged 28-30 (M= 22.3, SD = 2.57) 
materials and procedure
The experiment was conducted using the same 
experimental market, the same instructions and the same 
materials as Experiment 1. It was also run in the same lab 
by the same experimenters. Within each market in the 
Heterogeneous group, half of the participants received 
post-event information identical to that presented in the 
High Dividend group, the other half received post-event 
information identical to that presented in the baseline 
treatment. Additionally, each subject was marked as 
misinformed or non-misinformed, allowing within-
market analyses. Remuneration for participants was the 
same as in Experiment 1, at 1 PLN for each 100 tokens 
of balance at the end of the experiment. It was expected 
that transaction prices in the Heterogeneous treatment 
would be lower than those in baseline, Low Dividend 
and High Dividend treatments. It was also expected 
that non-misinformed subjects have higher returns than 
misinformed participants.
results
Fourteen experimental markets were run on 74 
participants. Six of the participants declared having studied 
economics or a similar subject, none of the participants 
declared having any experience investing. Participants in 
the misinformed and non-misinformed treatments did 
not significantly differ in age (22.61 vs. 22.00; F(1,72) = 
.045; p = .311) or gender (20 female and 16 male non-
misinformed vs. 26 female and 12 male misinformed; χ2 
(1, N = 74) = 1.301; p  = .338).
returns by misinformed and non-misinformed 
participants
The analysis was run including the number of tokens 
owned by participants as a Level-1 variable, nested within 
markets. The tested model was as follows:
TOKENS_OWNEDij = y00+ y10*MISINFORMATIONij+ 
+ u0j + rij
where TOKENS_OWNEDij was the average number 
of tokens owned by a participant throughout the market,
MISINFORMATIONij was a Level-1 predictor 
(whether a participant received the High Dividend or 
baseline treatment)
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the Heterogeneous group.
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The difference in returns between subjects receiving 
High Dividend and baseline post-event information was 
significant (F(1;716,033) = 31.990; p< .001). The average 
number of tokens owned by non-misinformed participants 
was 1069.112, for misinformed participants – 793.720 
tokens. 
transaction prices in the Heterogeneous 
group compared to experiment 1
To test the hypothesis that informational 
heterogeneity would reduce transaction prices as 
compared to homogenous misinformation and baseline, 
the three groups from Experiment 1 (baseline, Low 
Dividend and High Dividend) were compared to the 
Heterogeneous group. The HLM model used was identical 
as in the Experiment, including four treatments instead 
of three. Transaction prices were significantly lower in 
Period Compared treatments Mean diff. Std. error df p 95% CI
1 H baseline
LD
HD
-58,66
-59,64
-62,05
5,48
6,66
17,45
4508,41
4619,1
34,236
<,001
<,001
0,001
-69,40
-72,69
-97,51
-47,91
-46,59
-26,60
2 H baseline
LD
HD
-51,12
-53,84
-33,32
6,95
7,33
17,68
4372,24
4597,9
36,087
<,001
<,001
0,068
-64,74
-68,21
-69,18
-37,50
-39,47
2,54
3 H baseline
LD
HD
-30,14
-66,14
-52,18
6,92
7,76
18,11
4372,69
4548,94
39,687
<,001
<,001
0,006
-43,71
-81,35
-88,78
-16,58
-50,93
-15,57
4 H baseline
LD
HD
-23,90
-62,44
-80,96
6,60
8,05
18,44
4442,6
4655,34
42,686
<,001
<,001
<,001
-36,84
-78,23
-118,16
-10,96
-46,66
-43,76
5 H baseline
LD
HD
-24,81
-67,75
-81,69
7,70
7,68
18,44
4401,29
4494,91
42,661
0,001
<,001
<,001
-39,90
-82,81
-118,89
-9,72
-52,69
-44,50
6 H baseline
LD
HD
-34,21
-65,21
-105,18
6,76
8,39
18,69
4366,43
4443,88
45,077
<,001
<,001
<,001
-47,47
-81,65
-142,83
-20,95
-48,78
-67,53
7 H baseline
LD
HD
3,10
-58,03
-105,80
7,42
7,83
18,73
4376,29
4575,58
45,395
0,676
<,001
<,001
-11,44
-73,38
-143,50
17,64
-42,68
-68,09
8 H baseline
LD
HD
4,31
-46,75
-92,18
8,07
8,38
18,60
4352,29
4462,25
44,139
0,593
<,001
<,001
-11,51
-63,18
-129,65
20,13
-30,32
-54,70
9 H baseline
LD
HD
-8,61
-35,19
-117,11
8,28
8,83
18,89
4419,35
4544,31
47,003
0,299
<,001
<,001
-24,84
-52,49
-155,11
7,63
-17,89
-79,11
10 H baseline
LD
HD
7,47
-2,82
-125,20
7,74
8,74
18,43
4616,64
4509,26
42,617
0,334
0,747
<,001
-7,69
-19,95
-162,39
22,64
14,31
-88,02
Table 3: Multiple comparisons of transaction prices across treatments and periods 
(Heterogeneous treatment vs Experiment 1)
Note: LD - Low Dividend, HD – High Dividend, H - Heterogeneous
the Heterogeneous group than in the other groups in a 
majority of periods (excluding High Dividend in period 
2, Low Dividend in period 10 and baseline in periods 7 
through 10). Multiple comparisons of mean transaction 
prices across treatments and periods are presented in 
Table 3. Transaction prices across treatments in all periods 
are shown in Figure 2.
conclusions
Results of Experiment 2 were consistent with 
expectations. Most importantly, transaction prices in the 
Heterogeneous group were significantly lower than in all 
other treatments, demonstrating that misinformation 
may increase or decrease transaction prices by creating 
informational homogeneity (High Dividend and Low 
Dividend treatments) or heterogeneity (Heterogeneous 
treatment). It is worth noting that the Heterogeneous group 
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consisted of 50% baseline (non-misinformed) participants 
and 50% High Dividend misinformed participants. With 
transaction prices in the Heterogeneous group lower not 
only than in the High Dividend/Low Dividend groups, but 
lower than the baseline, heterogeneity seems to be the 
main factor influencing transaction prices. These results 
are consistent with research by Sutter, Huber and Kirchler 
(2012), in which informational heterogeneity reduced 
transaction prices. Sutter et al. explain this by stating that 
traders with insider information are more active, and 
therefore some of their information may be revealed and 
reflected in prices that track the fundamentals closer than 
in the other treatments (p.15). Sutter et al. provided clear 
information that participants are assigned to one of three 
information levels, so non-insiders were aware of the 
presence of insiders. This is not the case in the presented 
research – participants in the Heterogeneous group 
were not informed that other agents may have received 
different instructions. Such information could have been 
‘leaked’ in transaction prices, showing that various levels 
of information are indeed revealed in the behavior of 
market agents. Noticing that other traders have different 
information, market participants may implement safer 
Figure 2: Transaction prices across treatments (Experiment 2 + Experiment 1)
strategies in order to avoid exploitation by better 
informed traders (Sutter, Huber & Kirchler, 2012, p.15) – 
resulting in lower transaction prices due to risk aversion. 
Another explanation based on the paper by Corgnet, Kujal 
and Porter (2007) is that heterogeneous misinformation 
made coordinating agents’ actions more difficult, hence 
generating heterogeneity in offer and transaction prices.
A very important result is that within the 
Heterogeneous group, non-misinformed participants 
traded better than misinformed ones (as reflected by 
the difference in the average number of tokens owned, 
which in the final period was 990 for the misinformed 
participants versus 1455 for non-misinformed ones (p = 
,002). The conclusion is that misinformation is effective 
in reducing traders’ returns. This is especially worrying 
when we consider that while regulatory agencies strive to 
eliminate insider trading and to force equal access to all 
information for all market agents, the potentially harmful 
impact of misinformation as market manipulation remains 
uncontrolled.
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